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Does the President get the last word in the legislative process when he issues a
signing statement? Those angry about President Bush's December 2005 signing
statement on the Detainee Treatment Act thought he did just that. Implying that the
statute's prohibitions on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment would not apply in
certain circumstances,' President Bush's statement provoked an outcry.2 Critics
claimed that the President did not have the political muscle to defeat the statute, so
he instead announced that he would sometimes ignore it. Having the last word has
its advantages.
But so does having the first word. Signing statements come at the end of the
legislative process, but they also come at the beginning of the life of a law. President
Bush's signing statement was controversial not only because it was the last word, but
because his words mattered.' In the absence of a definitive judicial interpretation
of the statute, the signing statement would guide those in the executive branch who
were bound to follow the law.
This Article, using signing statements as one example, analyzes the various tools
available to Presidents to exert influence over actors in the executive branch. Signing
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See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act
of 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918-19 (Dec. 30, 2005).
2 See Elisabeth Bumiller, For President, Final Say on a Bill Sometimes Comes After the
Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at A11.
3 A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report seeks to measure the effect
of presidential signing statements on subsequent agency behavior. See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL
YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/
308603.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO examined nineteen provisions out of 160
singled out by the President in his signing statements. Id. at 1. In each case the President issued
a signing statement identifying some constitutional objection to a provision of a statute he
signed, and the GAO investigated what the agency thereafter did with respect to the pro-
vision. Id. It found the following: In six cases, the agency did not implement the statute as
written; in ten cases it did implement the statute as written; and in three cases the President's
objection related to a provision of the statute that did not come into play. Id.
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statements are notable because they permit the President to instruct subordinates ex
ante. They are, that is, the "first word"-the first step in the process of turning laws
into on-the-ground reality. But they are just one of many instruments Presidents can
rely on to manage, direct, and supervise subordinate officials. To assert their will,
Presidents can rely on the appointment power to place like-minded officials in key
positions, conduct White House review of important proposed actions of subordinates,
and, as signing statements illustrate, provide ex ante guidance to executive branch
actors about how they should exercise their authority.
Whether these tools permit the White House to effectively control the bureaucracy
is of interest in many quarters. It is of intense interest to Presidents and their staffs.
They face a vast executive branch staffed by people who will not always do as the
President would wish. Increasing presidential control over the bureaucracy is also the
subject of intense debate among observers of the executive. Many have documented
the fact of increased White House direction of the bureaucracy.4 Critics disagree over
the wisdom of this development. Advocates of accountability applaud increased presi-
dential efforts to control the executive branch.5 Critics fear that such accountability
will displace agency professionalism and expertise with politics. 6 For a politician to
have a strategy for White House control, or for a critic to have a view about the wisdom
of such control, it would be useful to know as a positive matter, which presidential
tools are the most effective and which are least effective in achieving presidential
wishes. This Article takes up that positive question. The agenda here is not normative;
the Article takes no position on whether further Presidential control of subordinates
is a good or bad thing. Instead, the Article takes the perspective of a White House
seeking to effectuate its will and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each of the
strategies available to the President to assert control over the executive branch.
To do so, the Article identifies a variety of circumstances in which Presidents
might worry about the actions of subordinates and examines presidential responses
in order to assess their efficacy. The President can appoint key personnel; he can
provide ex ante instructions; and he can review major agency actions ex post. These
strategies are not equally effective. As this Article will show, the effectiveness of
a given strategy depends both on the task assigned to the subordinate official and the
nature of that official's potential drift away from the White House. An important
' See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1994); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CI-n. L. REV. 1,3-11 (1995); Peter L. Strauss, PresidentialRulemaking,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 965-68 (1997).
' The most significant recent advocate is Dean Elena Kagan. See Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2319-46 (2001).
6 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, BeyondAccountability: Arbitrariness andLegitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461,462-63 (2003); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent




lesson of the analysis is that ex ante instructions, like signing statements, have some
distinct advantages over ex post review in controlling certain kinds of discretionary
actions by subordinates. In particular, ex ante methods of control could allow the
White House to control exercises of discretion by subordinate actors that are diffi-
cult to control through ex post means. Some of the exercises of discretion that may
be most effectively controlled by ex ante mechanisms are also generally immune from
judicial review. In the absence of judicial control of these administrative actions, the
President may be able to exercise particularly strong control over an agency.
I. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTION OF SUBORDINATES AND ITS SCOPE
A. Delegation of Discretion to the Executive Branch
Some federal statutes, like the Federal Employer's Liability Act,' largely regulate
the conduct of private parties. Others, like the False Claims Act,8 regulate govern-
mental conduct directly but require little governmental action to implement. But many
statutes that regulate private conduct (the Clean Air Act9) or governmental conduct
(the Detainee Treatment Act' °) permit or require some governmental action to inter-
pret or implement them. Executive branch actors are required or authorized to take
steps in order to translate the legal command into on-the-ground consequences. The
Department of Justice may be asked to interpret a federal statute that limits govern-
mental agents' conduct. Or, agencies may be authorized or required to take a variety
of actions. A statute may require an agency to promulgate a rule to implement the
statute, to entertain applications for government benefits or licenses, to adjudicate dis-
putes between private parties, or to bring enforcement actions against violators of
the statute.
Presidents, of course, do not take most of these actions directly. Many statutes
delegate authority to actors other than the President-such as the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and others. But even when a statute
delegates authority to the President, he relies heavily on others. Reliance on others
surely has its advantages, especially when there are legions of them. That increases the
number of tasks the President can perform, but it also presents a well-known problem:
Those who implement the law may not do as the President would.
' Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).
8 False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§
3729-31 (2000)).
9 Clean Air Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7642 (2000)).
" Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-0 (West Supp. 2007)).
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Just ask Presidents. They have long complained about their inability to control
the federal bureaucracy. Harry Truman lamented: "I thought I was the President, but
when it comes to these bureaucracies, I can't do a damn thing."" He later predicted
that his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, would become frustrated because "he'll say,
'Do this! Do That!' And nothing will happen."'12 John F. Kennedy told a caller, "I
agree with you, but I don't know if the government will,"' 3 and reportedly once lined
up fourteen people in the Oval Office "to find out where his executive order stopped-
because it never came out the other end."' 4 Richard Nixon bemoaned: "We have no
discipline in this bureaucracy."' 5 Jimmy Carter once told the press, "Before I became
president, .. . I realized and was warned that dealing with the federal bureaucracy
would be one of the worst problems I would have to face. It has been even worse than
I had anticipated."'' 6
B. A Guide to Presidential Strategies to Control Subordinates
Do not feel too sorry for them. Presidents are hardly powerless. They have many
tools at their disposal to control the bureaucracy. Power over personnel is first on the
list. The President appoints and can remove, either at will or for cause, the most senior
officials in the executive branch. 7 That relationship generally makes appointees loyal
to the President, and Presidents can and do rely on that relationship in all sorts of
ways, both public and private.
Power over personnel is important, but Presidents have more at their disposal.
Article II vests executive power in the President,'8 authorizes him to demand the
opinions of principal officers,' 9 and dictates that the President take care that the laws
are faithfully executed. 20 Together these provisions provide a constitutional foun-
dation for presidential supervision of those who implement statutes in the executive
" Burt Schorr & Andy Pasztor, In Command, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1982, at 1 (internal
quotations omitted).
12 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 10 (3d
ed. 1990).
'3 RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 1 (1983).
"' Schorr & Pasztor, supra note 11, at 1.
'5 THOMAS E. CRONIN, THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY 223 (2d ed. 1980).
16 Haynes Johnson, Test, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1978, at A3.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President currently directly appoints 3,500 executive
branch officials and may influence the appointment of around 2,000 additional officials
appointed by cabinet members and agency heads. BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., THE WHITE
HouSE STAFF: INSIDE THE WEST WING AND BEYOND 39 (2000).
,8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
19 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
20 Id. art. II, § 3.
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branch. 21 Presidents have issued all sorts of instruments-executive orders, signing
statements, directives, memoranda-to direct these subordinate actors.22
These presidential instructions come in all different forms, but because the form
does not dictate the content or effect of the instruction, paying attention to the form
is not the best way to understand the potential utility of these means of control. It is
more useful to think of these mechanisms along two dimensions: Whether they are ex
ante instructions or ex post review; and whether they are specific to a particular statu-
tory provision or a general command that applies across a range of statutory obligations.
There are a wide variety of ex ante methods of presidential control. One such
method is signing statements. Signing statements are specific, that is, they relate to
particular pieces of legislation.23 The President could offer a wide variety of views in
such statements, including his view of the substantive meaning of ambiguous statu-
tory provisions, 24 his view of how the statute should be implemented and enforced,
2 In a recent article, Peter Strauss helpfully identified a distinction between President as
"overseer" and President as "decider," arguing that the President should generally be under-
stood to have the authority to oversee subordinates' exercise of discretion but not to decide how
that discretion will be exercised. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President
in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 759-60 (2007). As will become clear, I
am taking no position on this long-standing debate. Whatever the extent of supervisory capac-
ity, I am interested in understanding which presidential control mechanisms are most effective
to exercise that capacity.
22 There has long been a debate, stretching back to the nineteenth century, about the
President's ability to direct the exercise of discretion by subordinate executive branch officials.
In the most recent phase of this debate, Dean Elena Kagan offered a defense of presidential
directive authority based on an interpretive principle to be applied when a statute grants dis-
cretion to executive branch actors. See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2322-31 (defending directive
authority grounded in statutory interpretation). Kagan argues that, in the usual case, such a
statute should be read to permit the President to direct his subordinates' exercise of discretion
under the statute. Id. at 2327-28. She limits her argument to executive branch agencies. Id.
Dean Kagan's strong and comprehensive defense of presidential directive authority revived
interest in this long-standing question. Professor Stack, for instance, has challenged her argu-
ment. See Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 263, 276-99 (2006). He points to the existence and long tradition of two
sorts of statutes. Some grant discretion to executive branch actors and explicitly state that the
agent will implement his mandate with the supervision of the President. Id. at 278-81. Other
statutes that delegate to subordinates do not contain such provisos. Id. at 282-83. Any directive
authority, Stack argues, only applies in the case where the statute explicitly grants the President
the power to supervise, direct, and approve the subordinate's action. Id. at 295-96. Professor
Strauss's recent article likewise revisits this question. See Strauss, Overseer, supra note 21.
23 See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 313 (2006); Kagan, supra note 5, at 2293-96; Christopher
S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 41-42 (2003) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University) (on file with author), available at http://www.ohio
link.edu/etd/view.cgi?acc-num=miami 1057716977.
24 Signing statements often offer interpretations of statutory provisions, but they usually
do so when the President indicates that the construction of the statute is necessary to avoid a
2007]
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or, as Presidents in fact have frequently done, his view that certain provisions are or
may be unconstitutional.26 Signing statements are not only ex ante, they are penned
at the start of executive branch action, before any other officials have begun to inter-
pret or otherwise implement a statutory command. Signing statements are not alone
in being ex ante instructions that are specific to a particular statutory obligation. The
President issues memoranda and statements instructing executive branch officials
to take certain actions.2 7 Sometimes such directives or prompt letters come from the
constitutional problem. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2092, 2093 (Nov. 25, 2002) (noting that new Director of the
Office of Science and Technology, who according to statute is to be appointed based on the
approval of the Office of Personnel Management, shall be appointed by the Attorney General,
in order to construe the provision consistently with the Appointments Clause of Article II);
Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 49,50 (Jan. 10, 2002) (directing the Attorney General to coordinate implementation
of statute requiring the release of classified information relevant to specified deaths abroad
in a manner "consistent with my constitutional and statutory responsibilities to protect various
kinds of sensitive information"); see also sources cited infra note 65.
25 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Docs. 2092, 2094 (Dec. 2, 2002) (directing that the new Office of International Affairs
will carry out its functions "in close coordination with the Department of State and other rele-
vant Government agencies"); see also infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing
the Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act, June 21, 1989).
26 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 226, 226-27 (Feb. 10, 1996) (directing the Attorney General not to
enforce a provision of the Act which required the discharge of military personnel living with
HIV, because the President deemed that provision unconstitutional); Statement on Signing
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 188, 190 (Feb. 8, 1996) (directing the
Department of Justice to decline to enforce a provision of the Act that would have prohibited
the transmission of abortion-related speech and information over the internet because the
President believed the provision was unconstitutional).
27 See, e.g., Memorandum on Increasing Participation of Medicare Beneficiaries in Clinical
Trials, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1311, 1312 (June 7, 2000) (directing the Secretary of
Health and Human services to revise Medicare program guidelines to cover the costs of clinical
trials of new medications and medical treatments); Memorandum on the Safety of Imported
Foods, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1277, 1278 (July 3, 1999) (directing the Secretaries
of Health and Human Services and the Treasury to adopt new standards for imported foods);
Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement, 1 PUB. PAPERS 906 (June 9, 1999) (directing
the Attorney General and Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior to collect and report
statistics on racial profiling); Memorandum on Clean Water Protection, 1 PUB. PAPERS 857,
858 (May 29, 1999) (directing the Administrator of the EPA and Secretaries of Agriculture and
the Interior to adopt new rules to enhance environmental protection of the nation's waters);
Memorandum on the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1084 (July 8,
1996) (ordering the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General to undertake enforce-
ment efforts to trace all guns used to commit crimes in cities in the United States); Statement
Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives on Nuclear Energy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 903, 904 (Oct.
8, 1981) (directing the Secretary of Energy to take a number of actions to promote the use of
[Vol. 16:27
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Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OlRA). 28 Although they have not generally been issued at the very beginning
of the life of the law, these instructions too are usually specific to particular authority
that the agency possesses.2 9 As Dean Kagan richly described, President Clinton re-
vitalized the directive method of executive branch supervision.30
Not all ex ante instructions are specific. Some provide general instructions to
agencies-identifying factors they must consider, processes they must follow, or both.
Probably the most well-known of such instructions are embodied in the various
executive orders promulgated over the years requiring agencies to engage in cost-
benefit analysis in order to support their proposed and final rules.3 1 President Reagan,
nuclear power).
28 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES'
DRAFr RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REvIEwS 50 (2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf [hereinafter GAO, RULEMAKING ]; see, e.g., Letter from
John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Claude A. Allen, Deputy
Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., and James R. Moseley, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't of Agric.
(May 27,2003), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/prompt-dietary-052703
.pdf (urging the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services to revise their
Dietary Guidelines and Food Guide Pyramid to emphasize the benefits of reducing consump-
tion of foods high in trans fatty acids and increasing consumption of foods rich in omega-3
fatty acids); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Armando Falcon, Jr., Dir., Office of Fed. Hous. Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) (May 29,
2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/promptofheo052902.html (request-
ing that OFHEO consider rulemaking to require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to disclose
publicly the information that is required of publicly traded companies by the SEC); Letter from
John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y,
Dep't of Health & Human Serv. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
prompt/hhs-promptletter.html (prompting the FDA to explore regulations addressing the
content of trans fatty acids in foods).
29 See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 28, at 50; see also Kagan, supra note 5, at 2295,
2303-06. See generally John D. Graham, Paul N. Roe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the
Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953
(2006) (describing from personal experience presidential management of federal regulation
in the Bush White House).
30 See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2293.
31 See Exec. Order No. 13,422,72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (amending Exec. Order
12,866 in various respects) (issued by President George W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638, 642-43 (1993) (ordering agencies to submit proposed and final regulations to
OIRA for approval and establishing a yearly planning process to ensure that regulatory actions
are consistent with presidential priorities) (issued by President Clinton); Exec. Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1981) (ordering agencies to prepare regulatory impact analyses
describing the costs and benefits of regulation and placing OMB in a supervisory role over
the regulatory process) (issued by President Reagan); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152
(1978) (ordering agencies to do cost-benefit analyses of proposed regulations and select the
least burdensome of acceptable alternatives) (issued by President Carter).
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in Executive Order 12,291, formalized and expanded this process, requiring agencies
to conduct cost-benefit analysis of their rules and submit their analysis along with
their proposed and final rules to OMB for approval.32 Although these requirements
are ex ante instructions about what an agency must consider, they also establish one
of the most important and salient instruments of post hoc review-White House
review of proposed and final rules.
OMB has issued many other general instructions to agencies about how they
should go about their business. Executive orders require most agencies to conduct a
government-wide planning process, a process that is attuned to presidential priorities.33
Other presidential orders set forth, ex ante, a variety of factors agencies must consider
as they implement statutes?4 For example, President Reagan ordered federal agen-
cies to provide opportunities for consultation with state and local officials regarding
planned federal programs,35 and President Clinton ordered federal agencies to take
steps to increase contracting with businesses owned by women and minorities.36 And
there are many more. OMB has instructed agencies how to handle information that
they rely on37 and how they should issue guidance; 38 it has established government-
wide standards for peer review of scientific information used by agencies;39 and it has
attempted to establish government-wide standards for risk assessments conducted
by agencies.4'
32 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1981).
33 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 at § 4 (1993); see Kagan, supra
note 5, at 2288.
31 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (1993) (elimination of unfunded man-
dates); Exec. Order No. 12,873,58 Fed. Reg. 54,911 (Oct. 20, 1993) (environmental impact);
Exec. Order No. 12,843, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,881 (Apr. 21, 1993) (environmental impact); Exec.
Order No. 12,372, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1982) (federalism concerns); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3
C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975) (impact of inflation); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339
(1964-1965) (use of non-discriminating government contractors). See generally Phillip J.
Cooper, By Order of the President: Administration by Executive Order and Proclamation,
18 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 233 (1986) (discussing how executive orders imposing policies may con-
flict with existing administrative law); Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498:
A Test Case in Presidential Control ofExecutiveAgencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483,489-98 (1988)
(explaining how executive orders serve as controlling directives for how members of the
executive branch administer federal law).
35 Exec. Order No. 12,372, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1982).
36 Exec. Order No. 13,157,65 Fed. Reg. 34,035 (May 23,2000); Exec. Order No. 13,170,
65 Fed. Reg. 60,827 (Oct. 6, 2000).
" Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22,
2002).
38 Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
39 Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005).
40 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSEssMENT BuLLETIN (Jan. 9,
2006), available at http://wwwwhitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed-riskassessmentbulletin
[Vol. 16:27
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Ex ante methods of presidential control can thus be specific or general. The same
is theoretically true of ex post methods of presidential control. The White House
might conduct the equivalent of a performance review of a particular agency. But most
ex post review of agency action is attentive to a specific proposed action. Reagan
originally set forth the most important of these processes in the executive order just
discussed.41 Details of that process changed, but Reagan's successors essentially
embraced the process.4 2 Various forms of intra-branch coordination-at least those
controlled by the White House-also serve a review function.43 Control of agency
litigation by various units of the Department of Justice likewise could be seen to
serve a "review" function, because the department does not bring every case that an
agency might like it to bring." The Department of Justice is not, like OIRA, housed
in the White House, but it nonetheless functions as a centralized reviewer. And some
parts of the department are closely associated with the White House. The Solicitor
General's office, for instance, has a monopoly on Supreme Court litigation on behalf
of the government, and it certainly considers the views of the White House in impor-
tant pieces of litigation.45
C. The Limits of Presidential Direction
It is important to note that there are legal limits to these various presidential
orders. In the absence of an unconstitutional law, the President may not direct execu-
tive branch officials to violate the law.' But, as any student of statutes knows, within
the boundaries of the law there are many important discretionary choices to be made.47
01 0906.pdf. For the notice announcing the PROPOSED BULLETIN ON RiSK ASSESSMENT, see
71 Fed. Reg. 2600 (Jan. 17, 2006).
"' Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). The effort actually began earlier with the
"Quality of Life Reviews" of the 1970s. See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch
Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 219, 221-22 (1993).
42 Kagan, supra note 5, at 2285-86; see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
13 For a description of one such occurrence, see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 563, 570 (2003).
41 See id. at 567-68.
46 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); Kendall v. United States ex. rel. Stokes,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see
Kagan, supra note 5, at 2323; Stack, supra note 22, at 272-74; see, e.g., Exec. Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981) (repeatedly limiting its instructions with the phrase "to the extent
permitted by law").
47 As may be obvious by now, the focus here is legal authority arising from statutes, not the
Constitution. As constitutional powers are delegated to the President himself, it seems clear
that, if the President authorizes others to assist him in executing those powers, the President
can direct others in their exercise.
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The important and contested question is whether, and if so how, Presidents can
dictate how a subordinate executive branch official exercises discretion delegated
by statute to that official.48 Relying on the Supreme Court's sanction of independent
agencies in Humphrey's Executor v. United States49 and some language in Myers v.
United States,5° some have argued that Presidents cannot direct the exercise of dis-
cretion delegated by statute to subordinate officials.5' Others, relying primarily on the
Vesting Clause's grant of executive power to the President and the Take Care Clause,
argue that discretionary authority delegated to subordinate officers is subject to the
President's control.52 Dean Kagan recently defended limited presidential directive
authority over executive branch agencies.53 She argued that unless Congress indicates
that the President cannot direct subordinate executive branch officials in their exercise
of discretion, the President should be read to have such authority.54
Whether, and if so how expansively, the President can direct the exercise of
discretion delegated to subordinate officials is an important and interesting legal
question. Even without knowing the answer to that question, however, it is clear
that the President has some real ability to direct the exercise of discretion. First, as
Professor Stack demonstrated, many statutes confer discretion to a subordinate offi-
cial but go on to state that the official will implement the statute with the direction
or supervision of, or in consultation with, the President.55 In such cases the statute
explicitly authorizes the President to direct the exercise of that discretion.
But even when statutes do not contain such provisos, Presidents can as a practical
matter influence-if not control outright-what subordinate officials do by use of
the powers that they unquestionably have. Presidents have the power to appoint, to
supervise and coordinate, and to demand information from their subordinates. Even
without the formal power to direct a subordinate's exercise of discretion, a President
can accomplish a great deal with the use of these powers. To effect his will, the
President need not dictate a result that the subordinate would oppose. The President
can just provide "advice"-in a signing statement, a phone call, a meeting in the Oval
48 See supra note 22 and sources cited therein.
49 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
50 272 U.S. at 135.
"1 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 24-25; Strauss, Overseer, supra note 21; Peter L.
Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 573,605-08, 648-50 (1984); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role
of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181,200-02(1986).
52 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231,
1241-46 (1994).
" Kagan, supra note 5, at 2320.
14 Id. But cf. Stack, supra note 22, at 267 (arguing that the President has the authority to
bind subordinate executive branch officials only when the statute expressly grants that power
to the President).
" Stack, supra note 22, at 276-81.
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Office-about his preferred outcome and trust that usually the advice will be followed
by the person he appointed.
11. UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL STRATEGIES
With respect to the set of decisions that Presidents are legally and constitutionally
permitted to influence, the President has a range of tools available to him. As devel-
oped in Part I, there are two general categories of instruments available to Presidents.
One is reliance on loyal personnel and the exclusion of disloyal ones. The other
category is various kinds of presidential orders. Such presidential orders should be
understood along the two dimensions mentioned earlier. Some are ex ante, and some
are ex post; some are generic, and some are specific. Should Presidents rely on all of
these tools? Or should it depend on the circumstances? If so, which tools are most
effective in what circumstances? This Part will answer these questions.
A. Agency Drift
To understand the utility of these various presidential control mechanisms, it is
first important to consider why a subordinate executive branch official might not fol-
low the President's wishes. That official, of course, may not know the President's
wishes. But, if the President wants his will to be known, he can make it known in
a variety of ways.
The other reasons officials might drift away from presidential preferences are
more difficult to manage. Bureaucratic torpor is one-an agency that does little. Dis-
agreement with the President is another. Such disagreement could be with respect to
a variety of matters and also at any level of generality-about the overall priorities, the
meaning of ambiguous statutory terms, the right policy choice among several that are
plausible under the statute, or the process by which the agency should implement a
statutory command. Last, the agency may sense pressure from some other actor(s)-
say, a reviewing court or members of Congress-to take an action that is not con-
sistent with what the President might wish. Congress funds the agency and drafts
its statutes, hence agencies must attend to what members of Congress think. Courts
review agency action on a regular basis and have developed a large body of legal
obligations that constrain agency action.
B. White House Strategies
The President's ability to control executive branch activity depends both on the
nature of the drift away from the White House as well as the task assigned to the
agency. For example, if an agency is moribund, reviewing its actions will hardly
suffice. If an agency is moving away from the President's agenda, appointing key
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personnel may be the best way to influence the agency. If an agency's pattern of en-
forcement action is problematic, ex ante instruction may be the most effective strategy.
This Part identifies the reasons why an agency's activities may not be in line with
the President's preferences and analyzes the effectiveness of each tool available to the
White House to cure that drift. First, however, it discusses the President's power to
appoint key personnel, which, in general, has systematic advantages and weaknesses
across the whole range of agency behavior.
5 6
1. Power over Personnel
The power to appoint key personnel is one of the President's most important instru-
ments for asserting his will over the executive branch. New personnel appointed by
the President might be able to tackle any problem; it is an across-the-board strategy.
New personnel can revitalize a moribund agency. They can act pro-actively to estab-
lish priorities, policies, or enforcement strategies. They can stop action that has been
making its way through the agency. If an agency flouts the President's will, new
personnel can establish processes to force information to the top so that those policy-
makers can control policy more effectively. No wonder that the President's power to
appoint key personnel has long been viewed as one of the White House's most impor-
tant strategies for asserting control over the vast federal bureaucracy.
But as a strategy for asserting control by the White House, the power over per-
sonnel does have some limitations. The across-the-board quality of new personnel
is also its limitation. If the President could anticipate precisely what the potential con-
flicts between the agency and the White House might be, the President could perhaps
choose personnel with those matters in mind. But Presidents cannot consider the
nominee's view on every issue and cannot predict all of the issues that might arise
at the agency. As a consequence, on a given issue, the President's personnel might
not share the President's views on all important matters that arise in the course of
the appointee's tenure. It is hard to believe that a President who appointed an FDA
Commissioner at a time with no food safety issues would have thought very hard about
his nominee's views on food safety. More likely, the President appointed the nomi-
nee for general loyalty and/or his views on the matter-of-the moment at the agency-
matters that have a way of fading when circumstances change. None of this mentions
the risk that White House staff fear: the risk that an appointee will "go native."
Another important downside of relying on personnel is that, if the official is not
acting in a way that pleases the President, removing the official can be costly. At the
most practical level, firing a senior official disrupts the action that official oversaw
56 The one exception to this is where the agency's task is adjudication, and the special con-
siderations regarding personnel placement will be discussed there. See supra, notes 74-89 and
accompanying text.
57 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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and directed. The departure, the search for a replacement, and the possible confirmation
process can all divert attention from matters that the President would rather pursue.
Removal of an official is also more constrained by political considerations than some
other mechanisms Presidents can rely on to exert their control. White House staff can
give instructions, make phone calls, or review what subordinate officials are doing
under the radar screen. But firing an official--even if dressed up as a decision by
the official to resign to "spend more time with family"--is both dramatic and public.
Although in some cases there will be political benefits to firing a senior officials, in
other cases the negative political consequences will be great.
Aside from control over personnel, which as a strategy has systematic advantages
and disadvantages (except in the case of adjudication, which will be discussed below),
a White House seeking to exert control over an agency has the option of ex ante in-
struction and ex post review. Consider the two problems the White House faces-a
moribund agency or a wayward one-with the two strategies in mind.
2. Curing Bureaucratic Torpor
Torpor is difficult to overcome with any method. But one mechanism extremely
unlikely to do much good is review of what the agency has done, as the OIRA review
process is primarily set up to do.58 A moribund agency is not initiating anything in the
first place. "Review" of what comes out of the agency will not solve any problems.
Ex ante methods, by contrast, are more likely to be effective. A signing statement,
prompt letter, or directive, all might push (force) the agency to act in the direction the
President wants it to go, and such presidential pushes might strengthen the hand of
the President's appointees in their efforts to revitalize the agency. The strength and
potential weakness of these mechanisms is that they are usually specific-"take this
action or that action under this statute." This narrows their range, and narrow inter-
ventions may not be what an agency suffering from torpor needs. But the narrowness
also increases the likelihood that on that particular issue the President will get what
he wants.
3. Taming a Wayward Agency
The White House may face a more multifaceted problem. Agencies may not be
moribund. Their personnel might be energetic, but their energies may be directed in
ways that the President does not like. An agency might not do as the President would
wish either because those in the agency have their own interests that are different
58 See Exec. Order No. 12,866,3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) for details of the OIRA review process.
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from the President's or because they are paying attention to the interests of some
other "principals"---congressional committees, reviewing courts, regulated parties
or beneficiaries-with interests that diverge from the President's.
These two reasons for agency disloyalty to the President are not necessarily dis-
tinct in practice. An agency may have developed its own agenda as a result of its own
tunnel vision, but that vision could be shaped in part by paying attention to the views
of important actors like congressional appropriators and reviewing courts. Whatever
the source of the agency's drift, from the White House's perspective, the result is the
same: the preferences of those in the agency may not align with the President's.
The source of the agency's drift, however, will affect the success of the White
House's efforts to nudge the agency in the "right" direction. Where the difference
between the agency and the White House is generated by those within the agency,
the White House's efforts to control that agency will be more difficult because those
in the agency may look for ways around the control exerted by the White House. But
where the difference in preference between the agency and the White House is gener-
ated by those in the agency fearing retaliation from another principal, the President's
effort to control the agency may actually protect the agency from those actors, pro-
viding cover when the agency is taken to task by those principals.
a. Hypothetical Statute: Five Agency Decisions
To see more clearly the advantages and disadvantages of each method of presi-
dential control, imagine that Congress has passed and the President has signed a new
statute that requires the FDA to overhaul the food labeling regime. Among other
things, the statute requires the agency to devise new nutrition labels for packaged food
products. This provision of the statute requires the agency first to issue legislative
rules outlining a new nutrition label to appear on all covered food items. Some food
products will be exempt from the requirements, however, and the statute requires the
FDA to set up a system whereby food manufacturers can apply for permits to deviate
from the required nutrition label. Finally, the statute authorizes the FDA to enforce
the statute by seizing non-compliant food products and seeking civil fines against
manufacturers whose food products do not display the proper label. Imagine too that
there is some tension between a public health oriented FDA that is invested in nutrition
labels as a strategy to combat obesity and a President who remains skeptical of the
benefits (when compared to the costs) of nutrition labels.
In the course of implementing this statute, the agency will make many choices,
and the President may wish to influence each of them. There are a set of choices about
priority setting and process that the agency will make with respect to each statutory
obligation and then there are the three statutory assignments: promulgate a rule;




The FDA will first need to determine where implementation of this statute and its
parts fits within its overall priorities. This can be a subtle art and is not necessarily
settled in any self-conscious priority setting process. An agency can "decide" to place
a statutory command on the back burner, or it can do the opposite-pursue implemen-
tation of the statute at the expense of other priorities-simply by being imbued with
a sense of urgency or not. It might delay its proposed rule. It might promulgate the
rule but then be slow in establishing the exceptions process. It might aggressively pur-
sue certain kinds of violators as it enforces the statute. Or it might not. Such agenda
control gives the agency a great deal of power.5 9
In the absence of an ex ante communication from the White House, all these
decisions will be the province of the agency. Ex ante directions, however, could in-
fluence priority setting, at least in the direction of pushing the agency to pursue some
task. Prompt letters, for instance, have often been aimed at agency priority setting.6°
The yearly planning process controlled by OIRA, outlined in its current form in
Executive Order 12,866, is similarly an effort at influencing agency priorities,6 '
'9 Ronald Wintrobe, Modem Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE
429, 431 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
0 See, e.g., Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't of Transp. (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www
.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/nhsta.promptl207Ol.html (encouraging the agency to give greater
priority to modifying its frontal occupant protection standard); Letter from John D. Graham,
Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y, Dep't of Health
& Human Serv. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs
_prompt_letter.html (urging the FDA to give greater priority to issuing a rule on the content of
trans fatty acids in foods); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to John Henshaw, Assistant Sec'y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. (Sept. 18,
2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompttosha.promptletter.htnl (suggesting
that OSHA give higher priority to promoting automatic external heart defibrillators); see also
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1277-80 (2006); Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257,
1288-90 (2006). For a list of all prompt letters issued by the Bush administration, see General
Services Administration, OIRA Prompt Letters, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/prompt
Letters.jsp (last visited June 22, 2007).
61 Under Executive Order 12,866, all agencies must participate in a yearly planning process.
3 C.F.R. 638, 642 at § 4 (1993). Early in the process, heads of agencies must meet with the
Vice President to "seek a common understanding of priorities and to coordinate regulatory
efforts." Id. § 4(a). Agencies must then prepare regulatory agendas listing all regulations under
development or review, and regulatory plans for their most important and significant regulatory
actions. Id. § 4(b)-(c). These plans must include, among other information, statements of the
"agency's regulatory objectives and priorities and how they relate to the President's priorities."
Id. § 4(c)(A). These plans are submitted to the Administrator of OIRA who disseminates them
to other agencies and reviews the plans for conflicts with the priorities of the President or
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though it may be too big-picture to influence details of the implementation of a par-
ticular statutory command.
By contrast, after-the-fact "review" processes would not easily facilitate control
of priority setting. To state the obvious, review is reactive. As noted already, such
priority setting does not require an explicit act by the agency. Bureaucrats sometimes
get what they want by being selectively efficient, that is, "being efficient at the things
they want to do, and inefficient at those they do not."62 When there is no action, there
is nothing to review. Even if the agency did explicitly engage in priority setting that
determined how committed it was to a particular statutory mandate, at the moment that
decision would not be subject to review by OIRA. General priority-setting is super-
vised by OIRA, but that is at a fairly high level of generality. 63 If the review process
were reformulated to include this fine-grained level of priority setting, the White House
might be overwhelmed. Perhaps, though, the White House could stop an agency from
taking an action that did not fit within the President's priorities. But review processes
alone could do little to prompt the agency to take action the President supports.
c. Process
A similar analysis applies to a set of discretionary decisions about the process
that the FDA may also make as it implements the statute. In the absence of ex ante
directions, the FDA will have a fair amount of control over the process by which it for-
mulates the rules and establishes the tribunal that will determine whether food manu-
facturers will be exempt from the requirements. The agency would, of course, have
to comply with the standard requirements like notice and comment when it promulgates
the rules for the nutrition label or the tribunal, but the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) is silent on many important matters of process. For instance, it has nothing
to say about the required process prior to proposing a rule or prior to establishing an
administrative tribunal.' In the absence of contrary direction, the agency might or
might not consult with others in the executive branch. It might or might not, consult
with outside groups as it prepares to implement the statute.
Ex ante methods of presidential influence could probably control the process the
agency follows. In a signing statement or directive, for instance, the President might
require the FDA to consult with the Department of Agriculture as it formulates its
proposed regulations from other agencies. Id. § 4(c)(F)(3)(5). The Administrator of OIRA
may advise the Vice President of such conflicts, who is then directed to consult with the
heads of agencies with respect to their Regulatory Plans. Id. § 4(c)(F)(5)-(6). Additionally,
the Administrator of OIRA chairs a working group of heads of agencies which meets at least
quarterly to "assist agencies in identifying and analyzing important regulatory issues." Id.
§ 4(d).
62 Wintrobe, supra note 59, at 431.
63 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
64 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
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nutrition labeling rules or to seek the input of particular outside groups.65 By contrast,
these agency decisions would be difficult to review ex post. Consulting, or not, with
another agency, for instance, need not require explicit agency action, and even if the
agency set forth its process in a rule, that rule would not, at present, be subject to OIRA
review. Such rules could be, but again, the White House might be overwhelmed by
such review, and in any event it would only have the ability to halt processes that it did
not like, not prompt process reforms it would like.
d. Rulemaking
Consider now the agency's proposed and final rules on nutrition labels. There
are many important choices to be made in such a rulemaking. The agency may have
to interpret key terms in the statute; it certainly will have to make policy choices-
for instance, choosing the best label from several plausible options. In the absence
of prior instruction from the President, the agency will make these important choices
in the first instance, and they would be subject to post hoc review by OIRA.
If the President in a signing statement or other ex ante advice offered an inter-
pretation of a key statutory term or indicates his preferred policy choice, what would
happen?66 Perhaps the agency could ignore that advice, but that seems risky and there-
fore unlikely. Perhaps it could disagree with the advice, but that seems unlikely too.
If the President offered an interpretation of a statute or his views on a policy choice
in advance of the agency attempting to answer those questions on its own, it would
seem most likely that the agency would follow the President's expressed view. In
65 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY CoMP.
PRES. Doc. 2092 (Dec. 2, 2002) (creating the Office of International Affairs to carry out
functions in coordination with Department of State and other relevant agencies); Statement on
Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. DOC. 1971 (Nov. 2,2002) (directing the Attorney General to advise heads of exec-
utive agencies of statutory provisions requiring reports to Congress on nonenforcement of the
law in keeping with the President's view of constitution and to direct that the provision will be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority); Statement
on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 49, 50 (Jan. 10, 2002) (directing the Attorney
General to coordinate implementation of statute within executive branch).
6 Compare Kagan, supra note 5, at 2298-99 (arguing that overt presidential command can
be a powerful tool for compelling an agency to comply with the President's wishes), with GAO
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (reporting that of a sampling of nineteen provisions of the 2006
appropriations acts which were the subject of presidential concern expressed in signing state-
ments, ten were implemented as written by federal agencies; six were not; and three were not
triggered thus requiring no agency action), and Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government,
supra note 51, at 666 (suggesting that if an agency administrator failed to follow presidential
advice, the President's only recourse would be to punish the agency administrator in some way
thereby incurring whatever political costs were inherent to that action).
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fact, it seems likely that the agency would do more than follow the President's lead.
It would develop explanations for why those are appropriate choices, explanations that
would be aimed at surviving judicial review. Through ex ante instruction, then, the
President is likely to exercise powerful control over the agency's choices.
Ex ante instruction does, however, have downsides. Such "advice" commits the
President to views early in the process of executive branch implementation. An ad-
vantage of early instruction is that it may prevent the agency from going somewhere
that the President does not want it to go. The flip side of that advantage, however, is
that the President becomes responsible for those instructions; he cannot deny respon-
sibility for agency choices. In some cases, it may be in the President's interest to wait
until the agency makes its choices, either because of the information that the agency
may generate about the wisdom of various choices, or because that way the President
can discern the political stakes associated with the agency's actions.
Compare the possibilities of ex ante control to the possibilities of ex post presi-
dential control. Once the agency develops a proposed rule, that proposal will be
reviewed by OIRA.67 That process can be difficult for the agency as the President's
budgeteers flyspeck the agency's proposals, reviewing the agency's legal inter-
pretations and policy judgments embedded in its rule and the agency's justification
for its rule. 68 It is no doubt true that this review-and the anticipation of this review
as the agency prepares its proposals-may limit the agency's ability to choose its
preferred option when that option conflicts with the White House's view.
Even so, the post hoc review process gives the agency some advantages. Most
importantly, the agency acts first, setting the terms of the debate, at least initially.
There are likely informational asymmetries between the agency and OIRA.69 The
agency knows the record better, knows the terms under which the review process will
occur, and therefore may be able to defend its choices effectively. More than that,
though, the process of review of agency proposals is public.70 That complicates the
67 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 at § 6(b) (1993).
68 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 60, at 1281; Steven Croley, White House Review ofAgency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 841-43 (2003). Data sug-
gests that OIRA has become, over time, more likely to return a proposed rule to an agency for
changes. In comparing review under the Clinton administration to review under the Reagan
and George H.W. Bush administrations, Professor Croley noted that "[w]hile the Clinton OIRA
focused on fewer rules, it required a change in a much higher percentage of the rules it
reviewed." Id. at 851 (emphasis added). Under the current Bush administration, the "number
of return letters and 'voluntary' rule withdrawals has also increased," leading to speculation that
OIRA is now even more willing "to force an agency to go back to the drawing board." Bagley
& Revesz, supra note 60, at 1281. See generally GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 28 (noting
increased use of public letters to prompt rulemaking).
69 Wintrobe, supra note 59, at 431.
70 See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 28, at 24-25. Both regulatory agencies and OIRA
are required to identify to the public all substantive changes to rules between the drafts sub-
mitted to OIRA and the final rules and changes made at the suggestion or recommendation
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process considerably. It means that the agency may be able to mobilize constituencies
to support its proposals when they are reviewed by OIRA. This does cut both ways.
The public nature of the process may also mobilize opponents of the agency's pro-
posal. But the agency has some advantages because it decides what goes in the rules
that will be reviewed by OIRA. A sophisticated agency may be able to play that
public game very well. In the end, the public nature of the process may cut in favor
of the White House's view or against that view; either way, it complicates the matter.
The blank slate of the ex ante instructions looks superior from the perspective of a
President trying to control an agency and willing to commit ex ante.
There is one other notable difference between ex post review and ex ante instruc-
tions. As presently constituted, ex post review by OIRA is more thorough. It mimics
the process by which agency rules are written, defended, and, not coincidentally, re-
viewed in court if challenged. To survive judicial examination of their actions, agen-
cies must arrive at reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes,7' and they must
defend their policy choices as the product of reasoned decisionmaking. 72 OIRA
reviews these agency decisions based on reasons articulated by the agency. This
process, at least formally, is governed by reasoned explanation of the choices made.
By contrast, ex ante instructions, again as presently constituted, are much less thorough.
They are declarative.73 Presidents do not offer elaborate reasons or entertain and reject
alternatives when they offer instruction to their subordinates. Courts require such
explanations from agencies when they explain and defend the choices they have made
in legislative rules.
Whether the "thoroughness" of White House supervision matters is unclear. As
I have suggested, if a President offered a view on a statute's meaning or suggested his
preferred policy choice before the agency began to make decisions under the statute, the
most likely outcome is that the agency would follow those presidential "suggestions"
and also supply reasons for those choices as it developed the rule. But it is possible-
though unlikely-that the choices the President required would be considered un-
supported by sufficient reasoning if challenged in court.
In the end, if a President hopes to exert control over an agency as it interprets
statutes and makes policy choices in the course of rulemaking, the ex ante in-
struction strategy may have some advantages and at least a couple disadvantages
when compared to the ex post review strategy. It is worth emphasizing that ex post
and ex ante review are not substitutes for one another. The analysis here is not meant
of OIRA, as well as log of all contacts between OIRA personnel and parties outside of the
executive branch. Id.
"' See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
72 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
73 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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to suggest otherwise; ex ante advice without ex post review might permit an agency
to slip out from under the ex ante presidential command. A President seeking maxi-
mum control over an agency could rely on both strategies; that effort would be useful
because the ex ante strategies overcome some of the possible shortcomings of the
post hoc review process.
e. Adjudication
Designing a new nutrition label by legislative rule, however, is not the only task
assigned to the agency by the hypothetical statute. Recall that the statute also re-
quires the agency to establish a process for exempting food manufacturers from the
required nutrition label. Such a process will determine the rights and duties of indi-
vidual manufacturers, and as such, the agency will be engaged in adjudication. Various
sources of law, including the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution74 and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),75 may constrain the agency's implementation
of this statutory obligation.
The substantive obligation Congress assigned to the agency is an adjudicatory
one, and as a result, the White House's ability to control the outcomes of individual
decisions will be limited. Both statutes and the Due Process Clause place limits on
control of the decisionmakers who adjudicate such claims. As a constitutional mini-
mum, the decisionmakers must be impartial.76 Under statutes and some regulations,
some adjudicators are entitled to a decisional independence that is even more robust.77
Under both sources of law, the White House cannot dictate the outcome of an indi-
vidual adjudication. 8
74 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7' Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
76 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) ("[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well
as to courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but our system
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted)); Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed Cir. 1999) ("It is consti-
tutionally impermissible to allow a deciding official to receive additional material information
that may undermine the objectivity required to protect the fairness of the process.").
77 For instance, the APA requires that administrative lawjudges (ALJ) be separated from
those who investigate and prosecute in the agency, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000), but that is not re-
quired by the Due Process Clause. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 52 ("[Olur cases, although they reflect
the substance of the problem, offer no support for the bald proposition applied in this case by
the District Court that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from
adjudicating."); see also Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 812 (1989) (suggesting that requirements imposed on ALJs must be weighed against the
potential infringement on the decisional independence of ALJs).
78 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993);
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There are steps the White House might take to assert control over adjudication
without violating the laws that protect the integrity of the adjudicatory process. There
are two strategies. One is controlling personnel-either the adjudicators themselves
or those who supervise them-and the other is by controlling the policy that the
adjudicators implement.
Appointing the right people holds some promise for the White House, but it will
be a less successful strategy than it would be in the context of agency development
of legislative rules-where courts are more at ease with political influences on
agency decisions.79
The White House's ability to actually appoint the adjudicators will be quite lim-
ited. If Congress required the agency to rely on formal adjudication as it implements
its statutory mandate, ° such adjudications must be presided over by Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs). ALJs have statutory protection of their independence"' and are
specially selected and promoted according to a separate process governed by the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM).82 Agencies themselves do not have much
control over ALs, nor does the White House. If the agency is not required to rely on
formal adjudication, there may be a little more room for the White House to maneuver
in influencing the choice of personnel. Non-ALJ adjudicators' selection and appoint-
ment are controlled by the agencies that employ them.83 Even so, individual adju-
dicators are unlikely to be presidential appointees. The agency can select non-ALJ
adjudicators, but it is possible that it could not consider a variety of factors, including
see also, Strauss, Overseer, supra note 21, at 710-11.
" See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
80 An agency relies on formal adjudication when the relevant program or organic act
"triggers" the formal rulemaking provisions of the APA or the agency's act itself requires
ALJs to preside over adjudications. See A GUIDETO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION § 3.01
(Michael Asimow ed., 2003).
81 See Bowen, 869 F.2d at 680-81 (holding that the Social Security reforms at issue did not
violate the decisional independence of ALJs and the APA does provide for such decisional
independence); Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D. D.C.
1984) (holding that ALJs are entitled to decisional independence, which might be violated by
the procedures outlined in the Bellmon Review Program); A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
ADJUDICATION, supra note 80, § 10.01 ("The APA and other sections of the United States Code
also provide for a broad array of protections for the independence of ALJs."). For a general
overview of ALs, see id., §§ 10.01-10.10.
82 See 5 U.S.C. § 1305(2000) (identifying OPM and Merit Systems Protection Board role
in ALJ employment); id. § 5372 (outlining the pay structure for ALJs); id. § 7521 (autho-
rizing actions for removal, suspension, reduction, and furlough of ALJs); see also A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION, supra note 80, §§ 10.04-10.10; ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. &
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 240-42 (2d ed. 2001); Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are
You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The APA, ALds, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV.
203, 226 (2002).
83 See sources cited supra note 82.
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political affiliation." Even if such adjudicators were political appointees, the Due
Process Clause requires that they act as unbiased decisionmakers when they conduct
adjudications.8 5
Although there is limited White House ability to appoint adjudicators themselves,
the White House could appoint senior agency officials and charge them with reforming
the adjudicatory system at the agency. The Social Security Administration engaged
in several widely-known efforts in this vein. 6 Former Attorney General Ashcroft's
effort to "reform" the process of immigration adjudication is a more recent example
of such a reform implemented by a political appointee. 7
These personnel strategies for controlling adjudication have important limits,
and the White House may find the second strategy more fruitful: control the policies
applied by adjudicators. Adjudicators must impartially determine the facts within
84 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, disability, marital status or political affiliation in federal personnel
actions). But see id. § 2302(a)(2)(B) (excluding from the provisions of § 2302(b) appointees
in "confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating" positions, as well
as any appointed positions that the President finds "necessary and warranted by conditions of
good administration").
85 U.S. CONST. amend V.
86 Faced with a record backlog of cases in 1975, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
implemented a number of reforms in its adjudication process. See Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d
10, 12 (2d Cir. 1980). These reforms included a "Regional Office Peer Review Program"
whereby supervisors and non-AU members of the SSA would review the work of ALJs out-
side of the normal appellate process and issue purportedly mandatory instructions regarding
the proper length of hearings and opinions, proper amount of evidence required in cases, and
the proper use of expert testimony. Id. Reforms also included a monthly production quota of
decisions for ALJs; a "Quality Assurance Program" in which the agency made it known that
an average fifty percent reversal rate was the acceptable rate that ALJs should conform to; and
an "Employee Pool System" through which certain ALJ responsibilities, such as decision
writing, were given to clerical or management personnel. Id. at 12-13. These practices were
challenged as an invasion of the decisional independence of ALJs. Id. at 12. The Second Circuit
ruled that the ALJs did not have proper standing but noted that, "good administration must not
encroach upon adjudicative independence." Id. at 17. Again, in 1981, the SSA attempted to
implement a review program to control its adjudicators. Under the Bellmon Review Program,
the "SSA used its discretionary authority to select ALJs' decisions for review and to target AL~s
with high grant-allowance rates for increased review." L. Hope O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative
Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence
Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591,617 (1986) (internal citations
omitted). In 1984, the D.C. District Court held that the Bellmon Review Program violated
decisional independence of ALJs as protected by statute and the Constitution. Ass'n ofALls,
594 F. Supp. at 1143. The court wrote that, if fully implemented, the Bellmon Review Program
"could have tended to corrupt the ability of administrative law judges to exercise" their inde-
pendence. Id.
87 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL
L. REv. 369, 375-77 (2005).
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their purview, but they are not entitled by law to set policy.88 One well-established
way that agencies have controlled adjudicatory outcomes is by adopting rules that
either limit what is at issue in an individual adjudication or eliminate the need for
adjudication entirely.89 As long as such rules are consistent with the relevant statute
and do not determine matters that must, under the Due Process Clause, be individually
determined, this approach is permissible-for the agency, or for the White House.
The trick would be to identify factors that can be decided by general rules and that
limit adjudication or eliminate the need for it entirely.
To see the potential efficacy of such an approach, consider an example. Imagine
that the nutrition labeling statute indicated that manufacturers will be exempt from
the nutrition labeling requirement whenever it is not "practicable" to comply. A sign-
ing statement or directive from the White House might advise that, in the President's
view, it is not practicable for small businesses, defined as those with fewer than one
hundred employees or $1 million in revenue, to comply with nutrition labeling require-
ments. There is a question of how an agency would treat the President's instruction,
but it seems likely that, upon receiving such instruction, the agency would adopt a
rule embracing that view of the meaning of practicable and grant blanket exemptions
to businesses meeting the definition of "small" because there would be no need for
a hearing. Just like an agency-generated rule of similar effect, as long as the rule is
consistent with the statute, the agency rule that was provoked by the White House's
advice on the meaning of the statute would be effective.
Although a general ex ante instruction could control or limit the domain of
adjudication in this way, adopting the same sort of general rule in an after-the-fact
White House review of an adjudication would be on shaky legal ground. The prob-
lem is that an after-the-fact review would inevitably look like an attempt to direct the
outcome of particular adjudications, in violation of constitutional and/or statutory
guarantees of fair process.
f Enforcement Priorities and Strategies
Once the rules are written and the exceptions process is in place, the FDA has
another set of decisions to make. The FDA is authorized by statute to bring enforce-
ment actions to seize products that do not comply with the FDA's rules.9 ° What if the
agency, left to its own devices, would bring no enforcement actions or would only
bring actions that are not in line with White House preferences? How effective would
ex ante and ex post review mechanisms be?
88 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decision-
making: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 481, 493-95 (1990).
89 See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco,
Inc., 377 U.S. 33,41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192,201-06 (1956);
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 895-98 (2d Cir. 1960).
90 21 U.S.C. § 334 (Supp. II 2002).
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The analysis may by now be familiar. Ex ante, the White House could have
significant influence over an agency's enforcement priorities and its strategies. It
could identify the priorities that should animate enforcement of the statute and those
that should not. It could identify the best enforcement strategies of the underlying
legal obligation. Without such instruction, these would otherwise be the agency's
decisions in the first instance, based on whatever factors it considered relevant.
To see the potential appeal to Presidents of such an approach, consider the first
President Bush's signing statement on the Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act,
an act that settled water rights claims by a tribe through legislation. 9' Under the
Winters doctrine, Indian reservation treaties "should be interpreted to contain an im-
plied reservation of sufficient water rights for the tribe to carry out the purposes for
which its reservation was created. '92 Indian water rights protected under this doctrine
override state water law.93 Thus, they must either be established as a consequence
of litigation or as a result of a "negotiated" settlement that is approved by Congress
and signed by the President. 9'
One enduring question regarding Indian water rights claims, then, is whether it is
superior to settle these matters through litigation or negotiated settlement. In 1989,
President Bush's signing statement provided a variety of directions to the Department
of Interior on this question:
Although the Administration favors negotiated settlements over
litigation, careful attention must be paid when Federal taxpayers
are asked to contribute substantially more than they might other-
wise pay as a result of litigation involving the Federal Govern-
ment' s alleged breach of specific trust responsibilities.
The Administration expects to continue to work toward settle-
ments of legitimate Indian land and water rights claims to which
the Federal Government is a party. These efforts will recognize the
importance of settling legitimate claims brought by tribes against
States, private entities, and the Federal Government. 95
The statement concluded with the following, "In recognition of these difficulties,
this Administration is committed to establishing criteria and procedures to guide
9' Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-41, 103 Stat. 83
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1773, 1773a-j (2000)).
92 Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417,420 (1991); see also Winters
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
93 See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, 23 Cl. Ct. at 421.
94 See Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 83.
95 Statement on Signing the Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 771, 772 (June 21, 1989).
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future Indian land and water claim settlement negotiations, including provision for
Administration participation in such negotiations." 96
The President's statement endorsed legislative settlement over litigation in the
matter of tribal water rights claims, expressed concern about the cost of this particular
settlement, and required the agency to adopt general criteria that would guide future
settlement negotiations. Just to underscore the point, notice that in the absence of such
presidential instruction, whether to litigate or negotiate and whether to adopt general
criteria would, in the first instance, at least, be in the hands of the agency. The agency
might not have chosen that path. Even if the comments contained in the signing state-
ment originally came from the agency itself, the direction from the President under-
mined the efforts of others who might wish the agency to pursue another course.97
The President's instruction guided the agency's behavior. In 1990, the Department
of the Interior adopted its Criteria and Procedures, pointing to the signing statement:
It is the policy of this Administration, as set forth by President
Bush on June 21, 1989... that disputes regarding Indian water
rights should be resolved through negotiated settlements rather
than litigation. Accordingly, the Department of the Interior
adopts the following criteria and procedures to establish the
basis for negotiation and settlement of claims concerning Indian
water resources.98
Gone from this rendition of the President's signing statement (perhaps not surpris-
ingly) is the President's concern about the cost of such settlements. Nonetheless, the
agency read the signing statement to favor a certain kind of approach to water rights
claims and, moreover, followed the direction to adopt the criteria and procedures,
which were the standards under which it would conduct such negotiations. 9
Ex post, it would be more difficult for the White House to exert influence over
such choices. As presently constructed, the OIRA review process does not apply to
enforcement actions.'00 It could, perhaps, be re-formulated to review proposed enforce-
ment actions, but it might be difficult to design such a system. White House reviewers
would be overwhelmed if government lawyers sought approval for every enforcement
96 id.
" See Dep't of the Interior, Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; Criteria and
Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990).
98 Id. at 9223.
99 Id. at 9223-25.
100 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 641-44 at §§ 3(d), 6 (1993) (limiting OIRA
review to "all regulatory actions, for both new and existing regulations," where regulatory
actions are defined as "any substantive action by an agency (normally published in the
Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule
or regulation").
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action. Thus, OMB would need to design a review process that only triggered review
of important enforcement actions, and it might be difficult to formulate the correct
criteria that would include the important decisions but exclude the less important
decisions. Even if such a process could be designed, the agency would have the
advantages that it has in any ex post process: it defines the agenda by formulating the
proposal; it has superior information; and it may be able to use the public nature of
the process to pressure the White House to do what the agency would like. Better
for the White House to try to head off such proposals in the first instance, through ex
ante controls, than attempt to suppress them once proposed.
C. White House Strategies in Context
First, take stock. The White House has many tools at its disposal to influence
actors in the executive branch. This analysis has shown that, of the strategies, con-
trolling personnel may be a winning strategy to address any concerns that the White
House may have, but it does have its limitations.
Ex ante instruction and ex post review likewise hold promise, but they have dif-
ferent strengths and weaknesses. Ex ante strategies can be used by the White House
to direct agencies in a wide variety of ways-prompting action, setting priorities,
establishing processes, setting policy and legal interpretation for both rulemaking and
adjudication, and designing an enforcement strategy. The fact that ex ante strategies
might address such a wide range of issues is an important benefit. But ex ante strategies
have an important downside: they force the White House to commit to a position early
on in the process of executive branch action.
Ex post review does not require the President to commit early in the process, and
it is generally a more thorough review of proposed administrative action than ex ante
instructions. On the other hand, it does not have the reach of ex ante direction-it
can do little to cure agency torpor or misdirected enforcement strategy or priority-
setting, for instance. More than that, the agency has certain advantages in the ex post
process-agenda control, information asymmetry, publicity-that it may deploy to
its advantage, and may not easily deploy when instructed by the White House in the
first instance.
Perhaps the most significant conclusion of this analysis is the advantages of ex
ante instructions. There is a voluminous and ever growing literature on OIRA's
review of major rules by agencies.'' By comparison, ex ante strategies receive little
attention. This is a true statement about the literature, and perhaps it reflects the
world. Presidents, that is, may have yet to fully exploit the potential of this strategy
of White House control.
But step back and the point is more significant. There are roughly three insti-
tutions that have the formal authority to control agencies in one way or another: the
101 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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President, Congress, and the courts. This paper has only analyzed presidential controls,
but sometimes, each institution closely supervises the agency. If an agency is develop-
ing a major rule, rest assured that members of Congress will be watching, OIRA will
review the agency's proposed and final rule, and most likely, a court will entertain
a challenge to the rule. The analysis here shows that ex ante controls are particularly
useful in controlling certain kinds of agency actions, including priority setting and
formulation of enforcement strategies. These important agency decisions, it turns out,
are largely immune fromjudicial review. " A President attempting to influence agency
choices in an important legislative rule or an adjudication competes in some sense
with the judicial review that may occur after the rule or order is published. Or, at
least, presidential control is circumscribed by the fact of judicial examination and
the parameters that that body of law imposes on an agency. But a President who can
effectively control an agency's priority setting or its enforcement agenda faces no
competition and no parameters from courts. Congress is still left standing, and it has
many strategies to assert control over agencies, including the way agencies set priori-
ties and formulate enforcement strategies. But, from the White House perspective,
one less institutional competitor--especially one with a judicial cast of mind-may
be a happy circumstance.
CONCLUSION
Whether White House influence over the exercise of discretion by subordinate
actors is normatively a good thing is not the question this Article addresses. It may be,
and it may not be. This Article has instead sought to uncover the systematic advan-
tages and disadvantages of various means of White House control of subordinate
actors in the executive branch. Understanding the logic of such strategies may help
inform the normative analysis, but it does not supply a conclusion.
02 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (agency allocation of funds from a lump sum
appropriation is "'committed to agency discretion by law"'); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821,832 (1985) (agency's decision not to initiate enforcement proceedings is "presumptively
unreviewable").
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